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Abstract 
This paper focuses on national public administration activities that relate to employment, social 
protection and industrial relations. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) refers to these 
activities collectively as ‘labour administration’ and regards the bodies that conduct them within 
individual countries as together forming national systems of labour administration. This paper 
explores the concept of ‘national system of labour administration’ and considers the potential 
contribution of comparative institutional analysis in understanding how national systems are 
organised and change over time. The paper also  compares the organisation of national labour 
administration systems in European Union (EU) countries and analyses how these systems have 
developed since the start of the economic crisis that erupted in 2008.  
 
1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on national public administration activities that relate to employment, social 
protection and industrial relations. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) refers to these 
activities collectively as ‘labour administration’ and regards the bodies that conduct them within 
individual countries as together forming national systems of labour administration (Author B and 
another, 2013). Although bodies that perform labour administration functions differ between 
countries, they typically include ministries of labour, public employment services (PES), labour 
inspection services and dispute resolution services. These bodies are responsible for devising and 
implementing labour laws and policies, providing support to unemployed workers, ensuring that firms 
comply with their obligations to their employees and providing advice to employers and workers. As 
such, labour administration substantially influences the operation of labour markets, the quality of 
jobs and outcomes relating to, for example, occupational safety and health (OSH) and the 
enforcement of labour standards. 
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Many of the issues that are of central importance to labour administration have received a substantial 
amount of research attention from academic researchers and the ILO. Much has been learned about, 
for example, the activities of ministries of labour (Rychly 2013a, 2013b), measures directed at 
unemployed workers (e.g. van Berkel 2009, King 2013), institutions of social dialogue (e.g. Papadakis 
and Ghellab, 2014), arbitration, conciliation and mediation services (e.g. Ebisui et al. 2016) and the 
role of enforcement agencies in encouraging employer compliance with labour laws (e.g. Páramo and 
Vega, 2017). Research has tended to focus on specific labour administration functions or policy areas. 
Recently, however, there has been interest in extending the scope of research to include comparative 
analyses of national labour administration systems (see Author B and another) and it is this that is the 
central concern of the present paper. The aims of the paper are twofold. The first is to explore the 
concept of ‘national system of labour administration’ and consider the potential contribution of 
comparative institutional analysis in understanding how national systems are organised and change 
over time. The second aim is to compare the organisation of national labour administration systems in 
European Union (EU) countries and analyse how these systems have developed since the start of the 
economic crisis that erupted in 2008. The paper begins with a discussion of labour administration as a 
component of public administration. ‘Comparative capitalisms’ and comparative public 
administration scholarship imply that there will be important differences in the ways in which national 
labour administration systems are organised, particularly in relation to the degree of centralisation of  
labour administration, the regulation of the labour market and the extent to which social partners are 
involved in labour governance. The paper therefore considers whether the characteristics of EU 
national labour administration systems differ between countries associated with different ‘varieties of 
capitalism’. It then moves on to examine changes in the organisation of different labour 
administration systems over time, paying particular attention to the period since 2008. The paper 
concludes by mapping out elements of a research agenda for comparative research in labour 
administration. 
 
2. Labour administration, public administration and varieties of capitalism 
Labour administration is defined by the ILO’s Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No. 150) as 
comprising ‘public administration activities in the field of national labour policy’. This includes 
institutions, activities and outcomes across the entire field of labour policy, including employment 
policy, labour law, social protection and industrial relations. The Labour Administration Convention 
and the accompanying Recommendation 1978 (No.158) provide policy guidelines and objectives that 
are intended to be given concrete form in specific measures adapted to national conditions. Their 
premise is that ‘adoption in a country of labour laws and regulations might be ineffective if that 
country does not have at its disposal a competent and efficient labour administration, entrusted with 
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the tasks of following the development of the social situation, of supervising the implementation of 
legislation and of ensuring the operation of existing machinery’ (Valticos 1979: 214). 
The ILO’s Convention No. 1501 also refers to the term ‘system of labour administration, which is 
defined as encompassing:  
‘all public administration bodies responsible for and/or engaged in labour administration - 
whether they are ministerial departments or public agencies, including parastatal and regional 
or local agencies or any other form of decentralised administration - and any institutional 
framework for the co-ordination of the activities of such bodies and for consultation with and 
participation by employers and workers and their organisations’.  
National labour administration systems therefore involve labour ministries (or their functional 
equivalents), the bodies that are responsible for delivering services, particularly those that relate to the 
re-employment of unemployed workers, the enforcement of labour standards and dispute resolution, 
and methods of involving employer organisation and trade unions in the development of policies and 
their implementation. In practice, however, countries differ in terms of the bodies that are involved in 
labour administration, how services are organised, the resources that are devoted to labour 
administration and the extent and nature of employer and trade union consultation and involvement 
(Author B and another).  
Although a number of comparative analyses of particular labour administration service functions, 
particularly public employment services (PES), have been undertaken (e.g. Borghi and van Berkel 
(2007), Finn (2016), Páramo and Vega (2017), differences between national labour administration 
systems in toto have rarely been studied in depth. The need for comparative studies has been 
emphasised by the ILO and researchers with an interest in labour administration (e.g. ILO 2011; 
Author B and another, 2013) and a small number of studies have been undertaken on behalf of the 
ILO (Author B). These studies tend to describe national systems at a particular point in time and pay 
less attention to how systems change over time and whether their development is path dependent. 
Issues related to system changes and path dependency are afforded considerable attention in the 
comparative political economy and public administration literatures. With regard to the former, the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) analytical framework, initially popularised by Hall and Soskice 
(2001), emphasises that the competitive advantages associated with different combinations of socio-
economic institutions create incentives for governments and employers to preserve and enhance their 
specific characteristics. Hall and Soskice initially distinguished between ‘liberal market economies’ 
(such as the UK and Ireland) in which coordination of economic activity is supposedly achieved 
                                                          
1 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C150 
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through formal contracting and market-mediated exchanges, and ‘coordinated market economies’ 
(such as Germany, Austria and the Nordic economies) in which coordination takes place through 
complementary institutions and networks that facilitate access to information, skills and other 
resources. Their analysis also emphasised the importance of cooperative industrial relations and social 
dialogue as underpinning characteristics of CMEs. Although Hall and Soskice did not directly discuss 
labour administration, their analysis nevertheless hints at ways in which national labour 
administration systems in CMEs and LMEs might differ. We might, for example, expect employers 
and trade unions to play a greater role in the governance of labour administration in CMEs than in 
LMEs. A ‘weakening of organized labor and a substantial amount of deregulation’ (Hall and Soskice, 
2001:57) accompanied by a ‘fundamental renegotiation of labor’s position (…) in the political 
economy as a whole’ (Thelen, 2001:103) is predicted for LMEs, but in CMEs, where deregulation is a 
threat to comparative advantage, the maintenance of labour-supportive regulatory regimes, ‘resiliency 
in labor institutions’, and a strengthening of social partners are expected (Thelen, 2001:71). LMEs 
might also be expected to make greater use of private and voluntary sector providers in the delivery of 
labour market services, given the greater emphasis they place on the use of market mechanisms. 
Furthermore, Culpepper (2001:302) predicts a greater degree of decentralisation in LMEs when 
compared with CMEs and the development of associations aimed at encouraging private actors ‘to 
begin cooperating with each other’. 
Various attempts have been made to extend and refine the VoC typology. Amable (2003), for 
example, substituted ‘continental’ (e.g. Germany) and ‘social democratic’ (e.g. Denmark) models of 
capitalism for Hall and Soskice’s CME category and also outlined Asiatic (e.g. Japan) and 
Mediterranean (Spain Portugal, Greece and Italy) models. King (2007) sought to insert the economies 
of Central and Eastern Europe into the VoC framework by defining them as ‘liberal-dependent’ 
economies that resembled the LME type while being more reliant on foreign capital.  
Similar typologies are to be found in the comparative public administration literature. Page (1995), for 
example, has distinguished between German Continental, French Continental, South European, 
British-Irish and Scandinavian types of administration while Tepe et al. (2010) have claimed that 
public administration systems within the OECD cluster into three regimes, which they define as 
Anglo-American, French/German and Scandinavian public management. These regimes are 
distinguished according to differences in their degree of public employment regulation (e.g. public 
sector collective bargaining) and politico-administrative regulation. Furthermore, Tepe et al. claim 
that, with the partial exception of the Scandinavian regime, there is a complementary relationship 
between public administration types and different ‘varieties of capitalism’ (e.g. LMEs have Anglo-
American public administration systems). 
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As has been the case for the comparative political economy literature, public administration 
researchers have been concerned with the question of whether national institutions and policies are 
converging or diverging. Particular attention has been given to the extent to which practices 
associated with the New Public Management (NPM) have been adopted and whether they have been 
adopted in similar ways in different countries. Some studies (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; Pollitt 2007) 
have found that NPM reforms have been strongly affected by national contextual factors (Pierre and 
Rothstein 2011), such as inherited institutions, prevailing traditions of governance and domestic 
politics and, as a consequence, reform processes and outcomes have varied among countries 
associated with a specific public administration regime type (Halligan 2011; Kickert 2011). However, 
while public administration regimes remain diverse, focusing on administrative systems as a whole 
may result in similarities relating to specific elements of public administration being overlooked, 
given national complexity. As Brans (2007: 271) has argued, comparative research is most likely to 
prosper if attempts are focused on relatively narrowly defined subjects rather than public 
administration systems as a whole (Brans, 2007: 271). A focus on labour administration, as opposed 
to public administration in toto, may therefore serve to provide clarity.  
An important concern for this paper is the impact of the economic crisis that erupted in 2008 for 
labour administration. Researchers in the field of comparative political economy have noted that 
liberalisation of labour markets since the start of the crisis has not been confined to LMEs and, 
moreover, that the crisis accelerated processes of liberalisation that were already underway (Thelen 
2014). Liberalisation in relation to labour market policy has included a weakening of employment 
protections and a dilution of entitlements in relation to social protection (Author B). While such 
developments suggest a common direction of change across varieties of capitalism towards an 
‘unravelling of CMEs and the further liberalization of LMEs’ (Baccaro and Howell, 2017:10),  it  
does not imply ‘that the CME category has been emptied so that the advanced capitalist world is 
populated solely by varieties of LME’ (Baccaro and Howell, 2017:15). For instance, on German 
capitalism, Hall (2015: 48) recently wrote that, labour market liberalisation notwithstanding, ‘the 
basic features of the German political economy continue to distinguish it from many others’, notably 
‘its Anglo-American counterparts’. According to Thelen (2014:202), ‘CMEs increasingly find 
themselves pulled in one of two directions’. The first is a Nordic CME model of ’embedded 
flexibilization’ in the Scandinavian countries, which combines marketisation with a collectivisation of 
risk, and the second is a Continental CME model of ‘dualizing liberalization’ in countries such as 
Germany, which remains coordinated but has become less egalitarian (ibid.).  
Analysis of the effects of the crisis on labour administration in different countries can, as the paper 
demonstrates, shed further light on these reform trajectories. In the VoC literature, economic crises 
are generally treated as ‘exogenous shocks’ that trigger responses that are closely related to the 
different varieties of capitalism, with each type of country acting to protect its respective institutional 
6 
 
complementarities and derived comparative advantage (Iversen, 2007). CMEs are expected to make 
greater efforts to minimise labour market disruptions resulting from the crisis in order to ensure 
continued access to a highly skilled and motivated workforce, whereas LMEs are expected to continue 
to favour more fluid labour markets. Consequently, the implied VoC prediction is that crises are path-
reinforcing, therefore leading to increased divergence between the different varieties of capitalism. 
The public administration literature (see, e.g. Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2014; Randma-Liiv and 
Kickert, 2017), however, considers an alternative possibility, namely that economic crises could be 
path-breaking rather than path-reinforcing and should therefore be treated as critical junctures or 
turning points. This notion is borrowed from historical institutionalist theory, according to which 
national institutional trajectories are characterised by ‘punctuated equilibrium’ – institutions that are 
relatively stable due to historical legacies, but which nonetheless may undergo change as a result of an 
exogenous shock (crisis). These two alternative theoretical underpinnings mean that public 
administration literature on the effects of economic crises on administrative reform is centred around 
a dichotomy between institutional continuity and change (Peters et al, 2011), which however draws on 
a common background that views crises as exclusively exogenous, neglecting capitalist dynamics and 
endogeneity.  
This overview of the comparative capitalisms and public administration literatures raises the question 
of whether differences between national labour administration systems correspond to the different 
‘varieties of capitalism’. We explore this in a European context, assessing the veracity of the 
following assumptions about labour administration that are implicit in the VoC literature:  
1. Labour administration is expected to be more centralised and coordinated in CMEs than 
LMEs. 
 
2. Marketisation of labour administration is expected to be more in evidence in LMEs than 
CMEs.  
 
3. A higher degree of involvement of social partners in labour administration is expected in 
CMEs than in LMEs. 
 
4. Economic crises are expected to be path-reinforcing in both LMEs and CMEs, thereby 
leading to increased administrative divergence between the two varieties of capitalism.  
 
Hypotheses 1-3 are analysed in Section 3 of this paper, while the effects of the economic crisis 
(hypothesis 4) are examined in Section 5.  
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3. The current state of national labour administration systems in Europe 
In this section we examine the organisation of national labour administration systems in selected 
European countries, in comparative perspective, against the VoC predictions outlined above. Our 
sample contains eleven countries: the UK and Ireland, classified as LMEs in the VoC literature, plus 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and France as CMEs. For purpose of comparison we 
also include the Czech Republic and Hungary as liberal-dependent economies which are expected to 
follow a broadly similar trajectory to LMEs (King 2007) and, Spain and Italy as examples of the 
Mediterranean model. Table 1 below summarises key labour administration indicators for our sample.  
To evaluate the first hypothesis (that labour administration will be more centralised and coordinated 
in CMEs than LMEs), we begin by analysing labour ministries as the central institutions in national 
labour administration systems.  One way to assess the degree of centralisation is to ask whether the 
ministry is holistic – i.e. responsible for all matters related to work and employment as well as social 
policy (Rychly, 2013a). This is the case for six countries in our sample: Ireland (Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection), Germany (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs), the Netherlands (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment), Denmark (Ministry of 
Employment), Italy (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy), and the Czech Republic (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs). In the UK, France and Spain, responsibilities are shared across ministries: 
between the Departments for Work and Pensions and the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (UK); between the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Solidarity and Health, and 
the Minister of State for Gender Equality (France); and between the Ministry of Labour, Migration 
and Social Security and the Ministry of Health, Consumption and Social Welfare (Spain). In Hungary, 
there is no de facto labour ministry; since 2010, responsibilities for labour and social welfare issues 
have been shared between the Ministries of the National Economy (renamed Ministry of Finance in 
2018), Interior and Human Capacities. In Austria, labour issues are the domain of a multi-portfolio 
ministry, the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Health and Consumer Protection (created in 
January 2018). Thus, there is diversity in the way responsibilities for labour matters are distributed 
across government, with no evidence of a consistent difference between CMEs and LMEs.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The veracity of the first hypothesis can also be assessed by examining labour inspectorates and PES – 
specifically, whether they are part of their respective labour ministry’s organogram, or instead 
autonomous. Labour inspectorates are on the organogram in six of the selected countries, suggesting a 
high degree of centralisation: Austria (Arbeitsinspektion), the Netherlands (Inspectorate SZW), 
Denmark (Arbejdstilsynet), France (Inspection du travail), Spain (Inspección de Trabajo y Seguridad 
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Social) and the Czech Republic (the State Labour Inspection Office). Although Ireland’s Workplace 
Relations Commission (WRC) and the Italian National Labour Inspectorate are quasi-autonomous 
(not on their respective labour ministries’ organogram but periodically supervised by the ministry), 
they nonetheless represent examples of centralisation, given that they had been created to merge 
functions previously carried out by a range of state agencies. Germany presents a mixed picture: 
labour inspection is not part of the ministry organogram, but in 2009 many formerly independent 
labour inspectorates were integrated into the general state administrative apparatus. At present, there 
is great variety between Länder, with autonomous labour inspectorates in some states, and labour 
inspectorates that are part of the administrative structure of the Land in other cases. Hence, it is 
Germany’s federalism that limits centralisation. In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is 
sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions but remains quasi-autonomous (not on the 
organogram). In Hungary there is no labour ministry organogram to speak of: safety at work and 
overall labour inspection activities are currently the domain of the Ministry of Finance, while the 
Ministry of Human Capacities presides over the Chief Medical Officer (ÁNTSZ), which carries 
responsibility for occupational health and work hygiene issues (Eurofound, 2015).  
PES are autonomous or quasi-autonomous bodies (not on the organogram) for most countries in our 
sample: Ireland (the independent Intreo service), Germany (Bundesagentur für Arbeit [BA]), Austria 
(Arbeitsmarktservice [AMS]), the Netherlands (Werkbedrijf, a division of UWV, the Employee 
Insurance Agency, an autonomous body), France (Pôle emploi), and Italy (Agenzia Nazionale 
Politiche Attive Lavoro). PES appear on the organogram in the case of Denmark (the Agency for 
Labour Market and Recruitment), Spain (Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal) and the Czech Republic 
(Employment Services Administration). The UK’s PES has been part of the Department for Work and 
Pensions since Jobcentre Plus ceased to exist as a separate entity in 2011. In Hungary, the PES is 
currently governed by the Ministries of Finance and the Interior. There is evidence that county labour 
centres receive conflicting instructions from the two ministries (Eurofound, 2015).  
Consequently, not only does this overview of labour inspectorates and PES invalidate the VoC 
assumption that decentralisation is more extensive in LMEs, but it also shows that (de)centralisation 
in one aspect of labour administration (labour inspection) does not necessarily mean (de)centralisation 
in other aspects (PES). On the other hand, we will see in Section 5 below that centralisation has been 
an important trend in labour administration since 2008.  
A further potential indicator of the ‘fit’ between varieties of capitalism and national labour 
administration systems is the extent to which labour administration bodies and activities are 
coordinated. To assess this, we focus on the degree of coordination between employment services, 
social assistance and social services, drawing on Bouget et al. (2015), who collated responses from 
national experts who are part of the European Social Policy Network. These experts were asked to 
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rate the degree of coordination in their country as either very good, medium, or weak. The degree of 
coordination was rated as ‘weak’ in the case of the UK, Italy, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and 
medium in all other cases. Administrative fragmentation, limited scope for formal coordination, and 
the lack of common databases were all cited as barriers to coordination (ibid.).  
The second hypothesis is that marketisation will be more extensive in LMEs than CMEs. We assess 
this by using the ‘extent of adoption of new public management tools’ as a proxy. NPM is a trend in 
public administration towards ‘enterprising the state’ (Author and another, 2013), which prioritises 
efficiency, quantifiable results, targets, as well as limits on spending. Values for this indicator are 
taken from Jeannot and Bezes (2016), who calculated these based on a survey with thousands of top 
civil servants across Europe.  Participants were asked to rate the extent to which NPM tools are used 
in their organisation on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means ‘not at all’, and 7, ‘to a large extent’. 
Country figures represent means of responses from that particular country. Amongst the countries in 
our sample, the UK appears to have adopted NPM tools to the greatest extent (5.19 out of 7), but it is 
closely followed by the Netherlands (5.01) and Denmark (4.82). The lowest degree of NPM adoption 
seems to have occurred in Spain (3.28) and Hungary (3.49), with Italy, Ireland, Germany, Austria and 
France somewhere in the middle. This suggests that marketisation is not confined to LMEs. Jeannot 
and Bezes (2016) data on NPM refer to all policy fields, not just labour issues. However, with regard 
to the adoption of NPM tools in European public employment services specifically, Weishaupt (2010) 
has shown that this trend started in the UK, then spread to Denmark and Sweden, and was later 
internalised by most other European PES as a result of a diffusion of ideas via EU institutions and the 
OECD. In practice, this resulted in ‘a common focus on performance, quality and case management as 
well as contestability in service delivery’ (ibid: 480) across European PES.  
Our final indicator reflects whether social partners are involved in labour governance. The 
information in Table 1 refers specifically to the governance of PES. A high degree of involvement of 
social partners in the governance of PES is apparent in Germany, Austria, France, and Spain, where 
social partners are members of governing boards. In these countries, not only are social partners 
directly involved in the governance of PES, but they also comprise the majority of the governing 
board members (Weishaupt, 2011). In Italy, the Steering and Surveillance Council of PES is bipartite, 
including unions’ representatives but not employers’ representatives (European Commission, 2016a). 
These cases seem to confirm the VoC notion that CMEs are characterised by strength of social 
partnership. However, in the Netherlands and Denmark there is little social partner involvement in the 
governance of PES (although, as discussed in Section 4, this has not always been the case). The 
liberal-dependent countries also score poorly on this indicator: in the Czech Republic, the state 
engages in negotiations with social partners only in informal settings (European Commission, 2016a), 
whereas in Hungary the role of social partners has been further weakened following the closure of the 
National Labour Office (NMH) (Eurofound, 2015).  
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4. Changes in labour administration over time 
The discussion thus far has suggested that the distinctions employed in the VoC framework are of 
little explanatory value where analysing national differences in the organisation of labour 
administration systems. In this section we consider common tendencies is the development of national 
labour administration systems over time.   
There is broad consensus among public administration researchers that the economic crisis of the 
1970s was a turning point which gave rise to common ‘mega trends’ of decentralisation, privatisation 
and marketisation in public administration reform across Europe and North America, which marked a 
rupture with the immediate post-war period (see e.g. Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2014; Randma-Liiv 
and Kickert, 2017). State-market relations were redefined towards ‘enterprising’ the state (Considine 
2001), with reform discourse focused on the notion of ‘efficiency’. These processes involved a shift 
away from traditional organisational principles of hierarchy and functional specialism towards new 
forms of governance that involved both a change in the way employees of public administration 
bodies were managed and the development of new relationships involving public and private sector 
agencies and those who consume their services, including an enhanced emphasis on performance 
management, entrepreneurial actions by public organizations, principal-agent separation, the 
development of quasi-markets and an emphasis on ‘citizen responsibility’ (Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 
2014:270).  
 
These developments in public administration coincided with a widespread shift towards the adoption 
of supply-side employment measures that placed emphasis on ‘gainful employment as the principal 
channel to achieve effective citizenship’ (Ferrera and Hemerijick 2003: 123) and political rhetoric that 
stressed the importance of workers enhancing their ‘employability’ through skill acquisition and work 
experience. This in turn influenced the delivery of employment services. A study of operational 
reforms in Europe (van Berkel 2009) identified five common trends: first, the creation of local one-
stop agencies that provide job search assistance and administer benefits; secondly, decentralization 
intended to encourage greater responsiveness of service provision to local and individual 
circumstances; thirdly, outsourcing and the creation of quasi-markets in relation to activation services; 
fourthly, efforts to diminish the involvement of employer organizations and trade unions in policy 
making or implementation; and finally, the use of targets and performance management systems. 
Efforts to strengthen the link between welfare entitlements and participation in the labour market have 
also led many European governments to locate responsibility for social protection and employment 
policy within a single ministry or agency. Examples include France (Pôle emploi), Ireland (the Intreo 
service), the UK, through the creation of JobCentre Plus in 2001, the Czech Republic, where social 
benefit administration was added to the employment service functions of Labour Offices in 2012 
(Lehmann and Kyzlinková 2015: 8) and Germany, where administrative responsibility for 
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unemployment assistance and social assistance payments was transferred to job centres in 2005 as 
part of the Hartz labour market reforms. The merging of employment and benefit services is thus 
evident in both LMEs and CMEs. These developments coincided with the imposition of stricter 
conditions on eligibility for unemployment benefit and stricter obligations for ‘job-seekers’. For 
instance, the Hartz reforms in Germany entailed also a reduction of long-term benefits, in terms of 
both amount and duration, as well as the replacement of means-tested flat-rate benefits with earnings-
related unemployment assistance (Weishaupt, 2011). In France, the creation of Pôle emploi in 2009 
coincided with a reduction in the duration of short term-benefits and an increase in the contributions 
requirement for long-term benefits (Coquet, 2015). Pôle emploi, Intreo, and JobCentre Plus are all 
examples of agencification of the state. While ‘agency fever’ is assumed to have originated in the UK 
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2014) this trend has extended across Europe, and, as the French example 
suggests, is not confined to LMEs.  
 
A further notable development in a number of countries were attempts to subordinate labour policy to 
economic policy, associated with reforms aimed at labour market liberalisation. Again, there were 
consequences for the organisation of labour administration. Some countries merged their economics 
and labour ministries into a single ministry. Examples include Hungary (1998-2002), Poland (2003-5) 
and the UK. In 1995, the UK’s de-facto Labour Ministry, the Department of Employment, was 
merged with the Department of Education and responsibility for industrial relations was transferred to 
the Department for Trade and Industry (now the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, a ministry whose primary responsibility was promoting the competitiveness of British 
industry. Germany, the ‘ideal type’ of CME in the VoC framework, took a similar path in the early 
2000s when a Ministry of Economics and Labour (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit: 
BMWA) was created through a merger of the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs and the 
Ministry of the Economy. The creation of the BMWA, which lasted until 2005, eased the introduction 
of the liberalising reforms associated with Agenda 2010 and the Hartz Commission, in that it brought 
about a diminution in the voice of organised labour in policy debates at cabinet level and led to the 
orthodox economic analyses associated with the former Ministry of Economics becoming dominant 
within the BMWA (Author B 2004).  
 
Both the spreading of responsibilities for labour issues across different ministries and the lumping 
together of such responsibilities with other policy areas into one ministry suggest a downgrading of 
labour issues. The VoC literature would expect such downgrading to occur in LMEs, but our sample 
indicates instead that this occurs in both LMEs and CMEs. The frequency with which ministries are 
renamed and responsibilities reshuffled and the confusion this creates places a significant strain on the 
implementation of labour policy. Innocuous as they may appear at first, such administrative reforms 
are indicative of deeper changes in the balance of social forces within a country. For example, the 
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case of the German BMWA, mentioned above, represented the culmination of a process of ‘business 
mobilization for neoliberal reform’ (Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017:166) in the face of globalisation 
pressures, which had started soon after German reunification. Against this backdrop of power 
resources shifting  towards business, a scandal involving inflated job placement statistics in the 
German PES in 2002 provided the then-Chancellor Schröder with an excuse for excluding trade 
unions and social democratic ‘traditionalists’ from policy-making, on account of them being 
‘defenders of the status quo’ (Fleckenstein and Lee, 2017). Thus, the perceived failure of a labour 
administration body (the German PES) led to the sidelining of organized labour within German 
society, with repercussions for another labour administration body, the Ministry of Labour, which 
became subordinated to the Ministry of Economics in this process. The evolution of the Spanish 
Ministry of Equality is similarly best understood in a broader context of changing power relations. 
Created in 2008 as a standalone ministry, it was merged two years later with other ministries to form 
the Ministry of Health, Social Policy and Equality (later Ministry of Health, Social Services and 
Equality). This change coincided with the apogee of Troika power and pro-austerity discourse in 
Spain, which turned equality ‘into a luxury that could no longer be afforded’ (Campillo Poza, 
2018:21). The ministry was restored in 2018 as a result of a new change in the balance of social 
forces, this time in the form of a new socialist government. 
A weakening of the voice of organised labour in labour administration has also occurred in many 
European countries. In the Netherlands the principle of tripartism in relation to PES was abandoned in 
2002 (Hoogenboom, 2011), and the social partners have retained only an advisory role at the national 
level as members of the Social and Economic Council whose recommendations are non-binding for 
the government (Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). Denmark has followed a similar trajectory: the 
social partners’ active role at the regional level, in governing regional PES offices ended with the 
creation of the Regional Employment Council in 2007 (Weishaupt, 2011), although they continue to 
play an advisory role at the national level. Even in Germany, where the social partners ostensibly still 
play an important role in the governance of PES, this role has been weakened since Schröder’s labour 
market deregulation reforms in the early 2000s. Since 2005 the social partners have not been involved 
in supporting the long-term unemployed, even in an advisory capacity (ibid.). Prior to that, 
unemployment assistance payments made to long-term unemployed persons after their unemployment 
benefits expired were administered by the BA, and hence indirectly by the social partners who make 
up the governing board of the BA. But following the Hartz reforms, responsibility for unemployment 
assistance payments (merged with social assistance payments) was transferred from the BA to newly-
established job centres, in which the BA governing board plays no function and has no rights to 
information (ibid.).Within the LME category, social partner involvement in the governance of PES 
ceased in Ireland after 2007-8 while in the UK employer organisations and trade unions ceased to be 
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involved in the governance of PES in 1987, when the Conservative government dismantled the 
Manpower Services Commission (ibid.). 
The developments discussed in sections 3 and 4 suggest convergence in labour governance in the 
sense of a gradual side-lining of labour issues in all countries, as evidenced by the limited prevalence 
of holistic labour ministries, the diminished role of social partners, and the high rate of adoption of 
NPM tools, instead of growing divergence between CMEs and LMEs as predicted by VoC scholars. 
The recent economic crisis appears to have further reinforced this trajectory. The effects of the crisis 
on labour administration are now discussed in more detail.  
 
5. Developments in labour administration since the crisis  
The crisis exposed some of the weaknesses of decentralised approaches to public administration, in 
particular the growing inability of governments ‘to monitor effectively and to regulate effectively’ 
(Peters et al, 2011). Consequently, the crisis is considered to have marked a turning point towards 
(re)centralisation. On the other hand, despite this new centralisation trend, other aspects of the pre-
crisis model of public administration are shown to have in fact been reinforced post-2008, for instance 
in the form of a new wave of privatisations following the crisis, especially in Southern Europe, as part 
of Troika-imposed bailout conditions (Kuhlmann and Wollmann, 2014). As Randma-Liiv and Kickert 
(2017) argue, this suggests that the crisis had a complex effect upon administrative reform that goes 
beyond the path-reinforcing/path-breaking dichotomy: it triggered new reforms in some countries or 
policy areas, boosted reforms already underway in others, and cancelled previous reforms in yet 
others.2 Centralisation along with fiscal retrenchment are listed as two main forms of response to the 
crisis common to all European countries (ibid.). However, there is variation in terms of the extent of 
such reforms, which is closely linked with the extent of the crisis itself, more vulnerable countries 
being associated with more extensive reforms (Raudla et al, 2015; Randma-Liiv and Savi, 2016). For 
example, while budget cuts happened everywhere, they were most extensive in countries that required 
financial assistance, especially given that international creditors provided financial aid to these 
countries on condition that they implement structural reforms. Another development linked to 
vulnerability is that in the countries hardest hit by the crisis the legitimacy of social dialogue was 
called into question most extensively, with public opinion increasingly viewing the social partners as 
at least partially responsible for the crisis (Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). In what follows, we 
examine centralisation and fiscal retrenchment as responses to the crisis in relation to labour 
                                                          
2 The reabsorption of agencies into their parent ministries (e.g. the reabsorption of JobCentre Plus into the DWP 
in the UK) constitutes a cancellation of previous reforms; fiscal cuts in countries such as the Netherlands or 
France represent an example of a continuation of reforms already underway before the crisis, since these cuts 
had been planned prior to 2007 (Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2017). 
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administration per se and assess also the impact of the crisis upon social dialogue as pertains to labour 
governance.  
 
Centralisation 
The recent trend towards centralisation can be explained by two related factors. The first is that 
centralisation helps to improve coordination and allows public administrators to better influence 
outcomes compared to a situation where the public sector is fragmented into myriad units (Raudla et 
al., 2015). The second is that centralisation can serve as a strategy for achieving spending cuts 
(Levine, 1979; Raudla et al., 2015), and thus fits in with the wider austerity drive since the crisis. 
Consequently, centralisation since the start of the crisis has tended to take two main forms: mergers of 
agencies or ministries, including reabsorption of agencies into their parent ministries, and a 
strengthening of central financial control over ministries and agencies, i.e. an increase in the power of 
Finance Ministries (Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2017).  
The survey evidence presented by Randma-Liiv and Kickert (2017) suggests that mergers of 
ministries and agencies have been the most widespread type of reform in European public 
administration since the crisis, occurring in LMEs (UK, Ireland, also East European liberal-dependent 
economies such as Hungary and Romania), as well as CMEs in their different variants (the 
Netherlands, Austria, France, Italy). Examples of this in the field of labour administration include the 
creation of the WRC in Ireland, National Labour Inspectorate (INL) in Italy, Pôle emploi in France, 
the DWP’s reabsorption of JobCentre Plus in the UK, the merger between the Labour Inspectorate 
and the Social Inspectorate in Romania, and the aforementioned (see Section 3 above) merger 
between the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Health in Austria. The Irish, Italian, and 
Romanian cases are examples of centralisation of labour inspection services, bringing formerly 
fragmented services together under one central administrative body. The French and British cases 
represent examples of PES centralisation. While these mergers had ostensibly been designed to 
simplify and streamline labour administration processes while reducing costs, in many instances the 
resources allocated to the merged bodies have been insufficient, resulting in these institutions being 
understaffed and overburdened (de Comarmond, 2010).  
The increase in the power of Ministries of Finance has also been an overarching aspect of 
centralisation across Europe (Raudla et al, 2015). This trend is evident even in countries such as 
Sweden or Norway, which had not been severely affected by the crisis (Randma-Liiv and Savi, 2016). 
This increased influence of finance ministries carries potentially profound implications for labour 
administration, particularly in terms of resource availability. For instance, PES budgets are generally 
decided as a result of consultations between the governing board of the PES, its sponsoring ministry, 
and the Ministry of Finance (Author B); increased influence of the latter changes the balance of power 
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in these negotiations and hence also the amount of resources allocated to the PES. Another obvious 
implication is that other ministries – including Labour Ministries – become less powerful.  
 
Fiscal retrenchment and its impact on labour governance 
As mentioned above, fiscal retrenchment was introduced across most of Europe as a response to the 
crisis, although the harshness of these measures tended to depend on how affected each country had 
been by the crisis, and on whether it had requested financial assistance from international institutions, 
which demanded structural reforms in exchange (Randma-Liiv and Savi 2016). Cuts have been most 
extensive in the areas of welfare, pensions, and healthcare (Randma-Liiv and Savi, 2016). A further 
consequence has been a reduction in the staffing and capacity of labour administration bodies. In a 
recent survey, 7000 public administrators across Europe were asked to rate the performance of public 
administration in their respective policy field over the previous five years. Employment policy 
received the lowest rating and was also the only policy field rated significantly below the mean 
(Huxley et al, 2016). The diminution of resources coincided with intensified challenges to labour 
administration as a result of the crisis, which significantly increased the workload of labour 
administrators (Rychly, 2009a; EPSU, 2012). In particular, increases in unemployment led to 
substantial increases in PES caseloads (the ratio of unemployed persons per employment advisor). 
Between August 2009- August 2010, the caseload of Pôle emploi in France increased from 92 to 103 
(de Comarmond, 2010). In Finland, the caseload doubled from 80 to 160 between the onset of the 
crisis and 2016 (OECD, 2016). Increases in PES caseloads have persisted in more recent years as 
well: for instance, between 2014-16, caseloads increased by 23.9% in Finland, 19.5% in the 
Netherlands, 10.5 % in Cyprus, 10% in Greece, 4.3% in Austria. Even where caseloads declined in 
recent years, high caseload numbers persist as a result of the crisis: for example, while Spain 
experienced a reduction in caseloads similar to that of Germany between 2014-16 (8.3 % and 8.6%, 
respectively), the outcome is a caseload of 596 in Spain versus 48 in Germany, with Spain remaining 
the country with the highest caseload in Europe (European Commission, 2016b). High caseloads 
make it more difficult for advisors to provide individualised support, calling into question the 
effectiveness of PES in minimising social hardship. Fiscal retrenchment also resulted in reduced 
training budgets for PES.  
Since the start of the crisis, there has been a significant decline in the number of labour inspectors in 
European countries associated with different varieties of capitalism: the UK and Ireland as LMEs, 
Germany and the Netherlands as CMEs, Italy as a Mediterranean country, Romania and Latvia as 
Eastern European states, etc. (EPSU, 2012). In the UK, the HSE budget was cut by 35% in 2010, with 
an additional 28% cut to the budgets of local authorities responsible for occupational health and 
safety; this meant job losses for many frontline staff, including labour inspectors (EPSU, 2012). 
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Ireland’s National Employment Rights Authority (the predecessor of the current WRC) had employed 
84 inspectors; the WRC only employs 53 (Author B and another). Between 2013-2014, the number of 
labour inspectors employed by the Inspectorate SZW in the Netherlands fell from 1119 to 1024; this 
is expected to decline even further given that the inspectorate will see further cuts in its budget 
between 2016-2020 (ibid.). In Germany the number of labour inspectors declined partly because of 
the non-replacement of retiring staff (EPSU, 2012). In Italy, the number of inspectors was reduced 
from 3761 in 2007 to 3479 in 2009 (ibid.) while training days for civil servants were reduced by 
29.3% over 2008-2011 (DiMascio and Natalini, 2014). The number of inspectors employed by the 
Romanian labour inspectorate was reduced by half between 2009-2016 (Author B and another), partly 
as a result of the merger between the Labour Inspectorate and the Social Inspectorate in 2009, and 
partly as a result of further restructurings in the Ministry of Labour (EPSU, 2012). The Latvian 
inspectorate experienced a 20% staff reduction (Author B and another), which caused several regional 
offices to shut down as well (EPSU, 2012). Even in France, where the number of labour inspectors 
initially increased at the beginning of the crisis (from 488 inspectors and 1053 sub-inspectors in 2007 
to 767 and 1423, respectively, in 2009 [EPSU, 2012]), this fell again after 2009, when all labour 
inspection services were merged and sub-inspector positions were eliminated altogether.  
The fact that the crisis has made the work of labour inspectors more complex and demanding, but the 
number of inspectors went down in most countries, poses risks for the safety of workers, for it implies 
fewer inspection visits, a greater risk of accidents at work, laxer enforcement of safety laws, as well as 
fewer resources to tackle discrimination and undeclared work (EPSU, 2012). There are also concerns 
that insufficient staffing will make it difficult for individual countries to honour pledges made to the 
European Commission in the field of work and employment: for example, Romanian labour 
inspectors stated publicly in 2010 that it is becoming increasingly difficult to comply with the number 
of controls the Inspectorate had pledged to undertake under a memorandum signed with the European 
Commission to tackle undeclared work (EPSU, 2012). The problem of understaffing of labour 
inspectorates is further compounded by the downgrading of labour issues in general following the 
crisis, manifest for instance in the placing of responsibilities for labour issues under other ministries: 
according to Eurofound (2015), the quality of labour inspection services has been steadily declining in 
Hungary in recent years, not least because such services had been placed under the supervision of 
ministries whose portfolios do not naturally encompass labour issues (Ministry of Finance).  
 
The exclusion of social partners from labour governance 
In most European countries and North America, the first crisis management phase consisted of neo-
Keynesian demand stimulus policies. Countries with established institutions and traditions of social 
dialogue involved trade union and employer organisations in discussions concerning these policies, on 
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the principle that cooperation would help reduce social tensions and conflict (Rychly, 2009b; 
Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). Negotiations between the government and social partners in 2008-9 
led to the adoption of the ‘Towards 2016’ agreement in Ireland which contained provisions vis-à-vis 
the rights of temporary workers (the first category of workers to be affected by the crisis), to the 
introduction of shortened work hours to avoid crisis-related dismissals in the Netherlands, and the 
formulation of the tripartite ‘Declaration  of  principles  for  the  promotion  of  the economy, 
employment,  competitiveness  and  social  progress’, containing anti-crisis measures, in Spain 
(Rychly, 2009b).   
However, this was only a short-lived phase; the crisis soon began to be portrayed as one of fiscal 
profligacy and lack of competitiveness in peripheral Europe, and hence used as justification for fiscal 
consolidation measures. The implementation of austerity reduced the time-frames for consultation as 
well as room for manoeuvre in national policymaking, severely curtailing or even annulling the 
participation of social partners in governance altogether. In countries where social dialogue was 
maintained during the crisis, this had a positive effect, facilitating growth, peaceful industrial 
relations, and increases in productivity and wages (ibid.); but this was the exception rather than the 
rule, with most countries in Europe experiencing exclusion of social partners from labour governance 
instead (Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). 
The greatest degree of discontinuity in social dialogue following the start of the crisis occurred in 
Ireland (an LME) and the Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece). The exclusion of 
social partners from governance is particularly striking in the case of Ireland and Spain, both of which 
had enjoyed strong social partnership prior to the crisis (Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). In Ireland, 
social dialogue continues only in the National Economic and Social Council (NESC), which has not 
been involved in any of the crisis or post-crisis reform negotiations (Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). 
Similarly, formal social partnership broke down in Spain in 2011, despite the fact that Spain had been 
one of the first countries to involve the social partners in designing policies to tackle the crisis back in 
2008-9 (Rychly, 2009b). In the absence of formal social partnership, the only forum left for social 
dialogue in Spain are bipartite consultations between trade unions and employers (Guardiancich and 
Molina, 2017). In spite of relatively higher growth rates in both Ireland and Spain since 2014, there 
have been no attempts to restore institutionalised tripartite social partnership, and ‘no expectations’ of 
this in either the short-run or the long-run (ibid.). The fact that in Ireland ‘the trade unions, for the first 
time in over 20 years, have no direct access to government’ (Hardiman, 2010, p 26) makes it 
increasingly similar to Britain, the other European country classified as an LME, which has no 
institutionalised role for the social partners.  
CMEs may not have experienced a total breakdown in social dialogue as Ireland did, but they too 
have been facing strains in regard to social partnership. Germany and Denmark in particular have 
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witnessed a decline in the influence of social partners over labour governance (Weishaupt, 2011). As 
noted in section 4 above, in Denmark this is a direct consequence of restructuring during the crisis, 
when regional PES offices governed by the social partners were dissolved, while in Germany it is a 
process that dates back to the Hartz reforms. The Dutch case also mirrors the German one, in the 
sense that social partnership had been weakened there due to labour market flexibilisation and a 
decline in unionisation that preceded the crisis, but which intensified tensions during the crisis, 
especially in consultations over pensions reform (Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). Due to these 
changes , the social partners in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands alike acted more like advisors 
than proactive co-decision makers during the crisis (Weishaupt, 2011; Guardiancich and Molina, 
2017). Weishaupt (2011) illustrated this distinction with reference to the Danish case. Prior to 2007, 
social partners in Denmark had been directly involved in the implementation of active labour market 
policies at the regional level, with substantial funds at their disposal, but lost their influence once the 
Regional Employment Council was created, and now mainly engage in ‘re-active criticism when 
Jobcentres fail to perform’ rather than ‘pro-active planning’ (ibid.:18). Moreover, even as advisors, 
social partners  exerted  limited influence  Despite the fact that social dialogue is institutionalised at 
the national level in Denmark in the National Employment Council, the demands of Danish unions for 
fiscal stimulus and improving qualifications were largely ignored, with the government instead 
choosing to tighten the benefits regime as part of its flexicurity strategy (Weishaupt, 2011). On the 
other hand, in Germany social partners were consulted in an ad-hoc manner during the economic 
crisis summits held at the Federal Chancellery and a formal institutionalisation of social dialogue at 
the national level was deemed unnecessary (Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). Austria is the only 
strong exception in this respect, as a CME that ‘has retained a modus operandi of strong social 
partnership and mutual trust’ (ibid.: vii). The UK and Austria are thus the only two countries in our 
sample characterised by continuity in social dialogue, albeit as polar opposites, with Austria 
continuing to exhibit a strong institutionalised role for social partners and the UK none.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper has shown that differences and similarities in how labour administration systems are 
organised across countries and their evolution over time do not correspond to the different ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ outlined in comparative institutional analysis. Evidence from Europe on indicators 
covering  the extent of (de)centralisation in labour administration, the degree of marketisation in 
labour administration, as well as the degree of involvement of social partners in labour governance, 
invalidates the central assumption of a clear CME-LME divide as pertains to labour administration, 
which is implicit in the VoC literature.  
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In terms of the impact of the recent economic crisis on labour administration across Europe as a 
common challenge, the path-reinforcing/path-breaking theoretical divide is likewise of little 
explanatory value. The crisis appears to have reinforced trends towards marketisation in the form of 
budget cuts, placing further strain on already overburdened labour inspectorates and PES offices, 
whose resources have been slashed while challenges have increased. It has, on the other hand, 
reversed other trajectories, as evidenced most notably by the recent turn away from decentralisation to 
centralisation, with mergers between ministries and agencies as the most prevalent type of reform in 
labour administration since the crisis. The gradual side-lining of labour issues appears to be an 
element of convergence across Europe, but the timing of particular stages in this process varies: for 
example, the merger between employment and benefit services, accompanied by stricter eligibility 
criteria, occurred before the crisis in some countries (e.g. Germany, the UK), and during the crisis in 
others (e.g. Ireland, France). The same is true of the dissolution of holistic labour ministries or of the 
exclusion of social partners from labour governance – such trends have been precipitated by the crisis 
in some countries, but date back to earlier restructurings of the state-market relationship in others. 
These (radical, in some countries) reforms of national systems of labour administration over the past 
two decades have reflected wider changes in public administration systems, which have involved the 
adoption of new management practices and organisational forms and a reconsideration of the interface 
between the public and private sectors and the role of the latter in delivering services. 
Reality is therefore more complex than the models envisioned by VoC theorists; indeed, it seems to 
invalidate the idea of coherent and continuous models altogether. In this context, the very concept of a 
national labour administration system becomes problematic, as it implies coherence and stability. 
Comparative research in labour administration would thus benefit from transcending the VoC 
framework, not least also because labour administration represents an arm of the state, and the state 
itself is under-theorised in VoC. A new research agenda would need to move beyond a strictly 
comparative analysis to one that is also relational; as increases in the power of the Ministry of 
Finance vis-à-vis those of Labour, under the pressure of external conditionality, show, interactions 
between countries (in this case, the wider EU policy framework under which national policies in 
individual member states operate) also matter. Labour administration would be best understood by 
using power and conflict as theoretical anchors, reflective of ‘the wider social relations in which 
[labour] institutions sit and are constituted by’ (Bruff and Ebenau, 2014:3). Doing this would allow 
for a ‘double comparative perspective’ (Bieling, 2014), helping to explain differences in labour 
administration between states, as well as within states through time, on the other hand accounting also 
for commonalities in capitalism. It would also aid our understanding of the effects of the crisis beyond 
the path-breaking/path reinforcing dichotomy, by treating the crisis as endogenous, with power and 
conflict as triggers of dynamism in capitalism, but also as potential sources of path dependency, in the 
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sense of policy conditionality that arises from the way in which past conflicts had been resolved in a 
particular space.  
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Table 1: Labour administration indicators – selected European countries 
         
 UK Ireland Germany Austria Netherlands Denmark France Spain Italy Czech 
Republic 
Hungary 
Holistic labour ministry? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Labour inspectorate part of 
ministry organogram? 
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes No Yes No 
PES part of ministry 
organogram? 
No No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Degree of coordination 
between employment, social 
assistance and social services  
Weak Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium  Medium Medium Weak Weak  Weak  
Extent of adoption of NPM 
tools  
5.19 4.37 4.09 3.96 5.01 4.82  3.96 3.28 4.48 Not 
available  
3.49 
Social partners involved in 
labour governance? (PES) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No  
  
